Repeated communication through the mechanism

We consider the "and" communication device that receives inputs from two players and outputs the public signal yes if both messages are yes, and outputs no otherwise. We prove that no correlation can securely be implemented using this device, even when infinitely many stages of communication are allowed.

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Year of publication:	2001-10-10
Authors:	Gossner, Olivier ; Vieille, Nicolas
Published in:	International Journal of Game Theory. - Springer. - Vol. 30.2001, 1, p. 41-60
Publisher:	Springer

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Extent:	application/pdf
Type of publication:	Article
Notes:	Received December 1998/Final version November 2000
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005375641