Repeated congestion games with bounded rationality
Year of publication: |
2012
|
---|---|
Authors: | Scarsini, Marco ; Tomala, Tristan |
Published in: |
International Journal of Game Theory. - Springer. - Vol. 41.2012, 3, p. 651-669
|
Publisher: |
Springer |
Subject: | Folk theorem | Braess’s paradox | Network routing games | Private monitoring | Public monitoring | Anonymous games | Strategic complexity | Contagion strategy | Calendar strategy |
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