Repeated Moral Hazard Under Limited Liability
Year of publication: |
2002
|
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Authors: | Bierbaum, Jürgen |
Publisher: |
[S.l.] : SSRN |
Subject: | Theorie | Theory | Moral Hazard | Moral hazard | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Beschränkte Haftung | Limited liability | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Haftung | Liability |
Extent: | 1 Online-Ressource (25 p) |
---|---|
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Notes: | Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments July 21, 2002 erstellt |
Other identifiers: | 10.2139/ssrn.315780 [DOI] |
Classification: | D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; J33 - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods |
Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
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