Reply to Byrne and Thompson
IN THEIR RESPONSE, AS IN THEIR PAPER, BYRNE AND THOMPSON elide the implausible assumptions that drive their model. Consider their statement: “Only a fraction of the population need view organ donation as costly for our results to hold.†Since I agree that survey evidence “unambiguously shows†that some people do not want to be organ donors it would seem they have proven their case. Yet, they have omitted the most important aspects of their model. For their perverse supply result to occur, not only must some people who truly find the prospect of organ donation distasteful nevertheless sign their organ donor cards in response to a monetary incentive, but, also, a significant portion of families must, in an attempt to discern the donor’s “true†intentions, decide not to allow organ harvesting, reversing the express intent indicated on the card. Because of their love for the potential donor, the families will try to have their cake and eat it too—that is, receive the reward for signing the organ donor card and also receive the reward of not donating the organs.
Year of publication: |
2004
|
---|---|
Authors: | Tabarrok, Alexander |
Published in: |
Econ Journal Watch. - Economics Department. - Vol. 1.2004, 1, p. 26-28
|
Publisher: |
Economics Department |
Saved in:
freely available
Saved in favorites
Similar items by person
-
Patent Theory versus Patent Law
Tabarrok, Alexander, (2002)
-
Race, poverty, and American tort awards: evidence from three datasets
Helland, Eric, (2002)
-
Runaway judges? : selection effects and the jury
Helland, Eric, (2008)
- More ...