Reputation and equilibrium characterization in repeated games of conflicting interests
Year of publication: |
1991-03
|
---|---|
Authors: | Schmidt, Klaus M. |
Institutions: | University of Bonn, Germany |
Subject: | Commitment | Folk theorem | Repeated games | Reputation |
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