Reputation and optimal contracts for central bankers
Year of publication: |
2011
|
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Authors: | Huang, Kevin X. D. ; Tian, Guoqiang |
Published in: |
Macroeconomic dynamics. - Cambridge : Cambridge Univ. Press, ISSN 1365-1005, ZDB-ID 1412233-9. - Vol. 15.2011, 4, p. 441-464
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Subject: | Geldpolitik | Monetary policy | Inflationsbekämpfung | Anti-inflation policy | Systematischer Fehler | Bias | Reputation | Vertrag | Contract | Zeitkonsistenz | Time consistency | Theorie | Theory |
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