Reputation penalties for poor monitoring of executive pay : evidence from option backdating
Year of publication: |
2012
|
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Authors: | Ertimur, Yonca ; Ferri, Fabrizio ; Maber, David A. |
Published in: |
Journal of financial economics. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0304-405X, ZDB-ID 187118-3. - Vol. 104.2012, 1, p. 118-144
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Subject: | Option backdating | Director labor market | Shareholder voting | Director turnover | Corporate governance | Corporate Governance | Führungskräfte | Managers | Vergütungssystem | Compensation system | Aktienoption | Stock option | Reputation | Managervergütung | Executive compensation |
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