Reputation transmission without benefit to the reporter: A behavioral underpinning of markets in experimental focus
Year of publication: |
2015
|
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Authors: | Kamei, Kenju ; Putterman, Louis |
Publisher: |
Providence, RI : Brown University, Department of Economics |
Subject: | reputation | prisoners' dilemma | experiment | punishment | communication | costly reporting | social preference | inequity aversion |
Series: | Working Paper ; 2015-9 |
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Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Type of publication (narrower categories): | Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Other identifiers: | 83492756X [GVK] hdl:10419/145432 [Handle] RePEc:bro:econwp:2015-9 [RePEc] |
Classification: | C91 - Laboratory, Individual Behavior ; D03 - Behavioral Economics; Underlying Principles ; D63 - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement |
Source: |
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