Reputation versus information : the delegation policy when the principal has reputational concerns
Year of publication: |
2018
|
---|---|
Authors: | Tamada, Yasunari ; Tsai, Tsung‐Sheng |
Published in: |
Journal of public economic theory. - Malden, Mass. : Wiley-Blackwell, ISSN 1097-3923, ZDB-ID 1468434-2. - Vol. 20.2018, 3, p. 367-389
|
Subject: | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Kooperative Führung | Participative leadership | Reputation | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Signalling | Theorie | Theory |
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