Reputation with long run players and imperfect observation
Year of publication: |
2009
|
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Authors: | Atakan, Alp E. ; Ekmekci, Mehmet |
Publisher: |
Evanston, IL : Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science |
Subject: | Repeated Games | Reputation | Equal Discount Factor | Long-run Players | Imperfect Observation | Complicated Types | Finite Automaton |
Series: | Discussion Paper ; 1506 |
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Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Type of publication (narrower categories): | Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Other identifiers: | 637697413 [GVK] hdl:10419/59624 [Handle] RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1506 [RePEc] |
Classification: | C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games ; D83 - Search, Learning, Information and Knowledge |
Source: |
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