Reserve bank autonomy and the credibility of monetary policy : a game-theoretic approach
Year of publication: |
1991
|
---|---|
Authors: | Buckle, Robert A. |
Other Persons: | Stemp, Peter J. (contributor) |
Published in: |
New Zealand economic papers. - Abingdon : Routledge, ISSN 0077-9954, ZDB-ID 415603-1. - Vol. 25.1991, 1, p. 51-85
|
Subject: | Zentralbankunabhängigkeit | Central bank independence | Geldtheorie | Monetary theory | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Neuseeland | New Zealand |
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