Resilience in Economic Sanctions : the Neglected Relationship between Resiliency and Credibility in the EU

Most research in International Political Economy has studied the economic resilience of the countries affected by international sanctions. However, few articles reasoned on the attributes that sanctioners need to reach their foreign policy targets. Indeed, economic resilience against the spill-over effects of sanctions is paramount. For this reason, this study investigates the interaction between resiliency and credibility in the EU when implementing economic and financial penalties and their success. The article qualitatively assesses how resilience changes the success probabilities of sanctions. The analysis compares various EU sanctions against economically influential countries, namely Russia, Iran, and Turkey. Therefore, the interaction between diverse economic counter-effects and European resilience affects the probability of effective coercion. Resiliency is measured as the swift capacity to diversify the imports of raw materials and the policy implemented by the EU to withstand detrimental sanctioning feedback. Indeed, this is a reliable operationalization of the aggregate capacity of sanctioning countries to reduce sanction costs. This contribution helps understand the efficacy of the EU sanctions. This paper provides insights into how the EU can create a more independent and resilient economic and political system capable of resisting shocks in financial markets and domestic politics. Furthermore, with greater resilience, the EU penalties will be more credible and, thus, more efficacious in the long term