Resisting Moral Wiggle Room: How Robust Is Reciprocal Behavior?

We provide the second mover in a trust game and a moonlighting game with an excuse for not reciprocating. While this type of manipulation has been shown to strongly reduce giving in the dictator game, we find that the availability of the excuse has no effect on the incidence of reciprocal behavior in these games. Our results cast doubt on the generalizability of previous dictator game findings and suggest that image concerns are not a key driver of reciprocal behavior.

MoreLess

Year of publication:	2014
Authors:	Jo?l J. van der Weele ; Kulisa, Julija ; Kosfeld, Michael ; Friebel, Guido
Published in:	American Economic Journal: Microeconomics. - American Economic Association - AEA. - Vol. 6.2014, 3, p. 256-64
Publisher:	American Economic Association - AEA

Online Resource

Check full text access |

More access options

www.aeaweb.org

Check Google Scholar

In German libraries (KVK)

I need help

More details

Extent:	application/pdf application/zip
Type of publication:	Article
Notes:	DOI: 10.1257/mic.6.3.256
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games ; D64 - Altruism ; Z13 - Social Norms and Social Capital
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010815839