Ressource non renouvelable polluante : décentralisation de l'optimum en présence d'un pouvoir de marché

In this paper, I study the strategic interactions between a country that owns a monopoly on a polluting non renewable resource (basically, the OPEC), and a representative of countries that both consume the resource and are hurt by its pollution. Both pollution control and rent captation are at stake in this model.

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Alternative title:	Polluting nonrenewable resources: decentralization of the optimum in the presence of market power
Year of publication:	2007
Authors:	Belgodere, Antoine
Institutions:	Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München
Subject:	nonrenewable resources \| stok pollution \| differetial games

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	MPRA Paper.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Classification:	Q3 - Nonrenewable Resources and Conservation ; H23 - Externalities; Redistributive Effects ; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies ; Q54 - Climate; Natural Disasters
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008805829