Revenue comparisons for auctions when bidders have arbitrary types
Year of publication: |
Juni 2006
|
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Authors: | Che, Yeon-Koo ; Gale, Ian L. |
Published in: |
Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in economic theory. - Toronto : [Verlag nicht ermittelbar], ISSN 1555-7561, ZDB-ID 2220447-7. - Vol. 1.2006, 1, p. 95-118
|
Subject: | Auctions | multidimensional types and atoms | risk aversion | Gateaux differentiable preferences | Präferenztheorie | Theory of preferences | Auktionstheorie | Auction theory | Risikoaversion | Risk aversion |
Type of publication: | Article |
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Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal |
Language: | English |
Other identifiers: | hdl:10419/150075 [Handle] |
Classification: | C70 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory. General ; D44 - Auctions |
Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
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