Revenue maximizing auctions with market interaction and signaling

We show that under post-auction market interaction revealing (hiding) information is revenue maximizing if the utility function is convex (concave) in the signaled type. Previous literature considered the sign of the first derivative with respect to the perceived type crucial.

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Year of publication:	2008
Authors:	Molnár, József ; Virág, Gábor
Published in:	Economics Letters. - Elsevier, ISSN 0165-1765. - Vol. 99.2008, 2, p. 360-363
Publisher:	Elsevier

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Type of publication:	Article
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005270297