Revenue ranking of first-price auctions with resale

When the price setter in post-auction resale is chosen according to exogenous probabilities, Hafalir and Krishna (2008) [2] showed that the first-price auction brings more expected revenues than the second-price auction with truth-bidding bidders. We complete their revenue ranking by proving that the first-price auction produces higher expected revenues the higher the probability the auction winner sets the resale price.

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Year of publication:	2010
Authors:	Lebrun, Bernard
Published in:	Journal of Economic Theory. - Elsevier, ISSN 0022-0531. - Vol. 145.2010, 5, p. 2037-2043
Publisher:	Elsevier
Subject:	Auctions Resale First-price Mechanism

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Type of publication:	Article
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

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