Reward self-reporting to deter corruption : an experiment on mitigating collusive bribery
Year of publication: |
January 2017
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Authors: | Abbink, Klaus ; Wu, Kevin |
Published in: |
Journal of economic behavior & organization : JEBO. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0167-2681, ZDB-ID 864321-0. - Vol. 133.2017, p. 256-272
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Subject: | Collusive bribery | Experiment | Asymmetric reporting | Reward | Bonus Leniency | Korruption | Corruption | Wettbewerbsbeschränkung | Restraints of competition | Kartell | Cartel | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Leistungsentgelt | Performance pay | Theorie | Theory | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Vergütungssystem | Compensation system |
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