Rewarding poor performance : why do boards of directors increase new options in response to CEO underwater options?
Yuanyuan Sun and Taekjin Shin
| Year of publication: |
September 2014
|
|---|---|
| Authors: | Sun, Yuanyuan ; Shin, Taekjin |
| Published in: |
Corporate governance : an international review. - Oxford : Blackwell, ISSN 0964-8410, ZDB-ID 1280434-4. - Vol. 22.2014, 5, p. 408-421
|
| Subject: | Corporate Governance | Executive Compensation | Agency Theory | Attribution Theory | Board Policy Issues | Führungskräfte | Managers | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Corporate governance | Vorstand | Executive board | Managervergütung | Executive compensation | Vergütungssystem | Compensation system |
| Type of publication: | Article |
|---|---|
| Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal |
| Language: | English |
| Other identifiers: | 10.1111/corg.12065 [DOI] |
| Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011570617