Rewarding successes discourages experimentation
Year of publication: |
December 2017
|
---|---|
Authors: | Terai, Kimiko ; Glazer, Amihai |
Published in: |
FinanzArchiv : European journal of public finance. - Tübingen : Mohr Siebeck, ISSN 0015-2218, ZDB-ID 2020-5. - Vol. 73.2017, 4, p. 361-381
|
Subject: | experimentation | risk aversion | budget allocation | innovation | federalism | Theorie | Theory | Experiment | Risikoaversion | Risk aversion | Innovation | Allokation | Allocation |
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