Ring-Fencing Cross-Border Banks : An Effective Supervisory Response?

While international policymakers are making good progress on the important work of global resolution and the preparation of recovery and resolution plans, a growing number of supervisors, home as well as hosts, are resorting to territorial approaches. Higher capital ratios, dividend restrictions, restrictions on liquidity flows and even forced subsidiarization are gaining renewed popularity. The objective of these territorial approaches is to protect the interests of the domestic stakeholders of a foreign bank and to limit the effects of cross-border contagion. This type of “ring-fencing” has a negative connotation as it comes at a cost for banks and the efficiency of the overall global financial system. This article addresses the following questions:(1) What makes prudential supervisors more likely to ring-fence?; (2) Do all forms of ring-fencing really deserve this bad reputation?; (3) What are the risks that these measures are addressing and which instruments have been used?; and (4) What are the implications of ring-fencing for the banking group, financial stability in the home and host country, as well as global financial stability?