Risk-Averse Duopolists and Voluntary Information Transmission.
This paper considers the incentives for risk-averse firms to share their private information. They show that the introduction of risk aversion in some cases reverses the result in the literature that no such incentives exist. Further, they show that the output level of risk-averse Cournot duopolists is increasing in the quality of their private information and decreasing in their perception of risk. Copyright 1989 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
Year of publication: |
1989
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Authors: | Hviid, Morten |
Published in: |
Journal of Industrial Economics. - Wiley Blackwell. - Vol. 38.1989, 1, p. 49-64
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Publisher: |
Wiley Blackwell |
Saved in:
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