Risk averse supervisors and the efficiency of collusion
Antoine Faure-Grimaud; Jean-Jacques Laffont; David Martimort
| Year of publication: |
2002 ; [Elektronische Ressource]
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|---|---|
| Other Persons: | Faure-Grimaud, Antoine (contributor) ; Laffont, Jean-Jacques (contributor) ; Martimort, David (contributor) |
| Published in: |
Contributions to theoretical economics. - Berkeley, Calif. : Bepress, ISSN 1534-5971, ZDB-ID 2040052-4. - Vol. 2.2002, 1
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| Subject: | Leistungsbeurteilung | Employee performance appraisal | Kartell | Cartel | Vertrag | Contract | Risikoaversion | Risk aversion | Wettbewerb | Competition | Theorie | Theory |
| Extent: | ill |
|---|---|
| Type of publication: | Article |
| Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal |
| Language: | English |
| Notes: | In: Contributions to theoretical economics Systemvoraussetzung: Acrobat reader |
| Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001739671