Risk Averse Supervisors and the Efficiency of Collusion
Year of publication: |
2003
|
---|---|
Authors: | Faure-Grimaud, Antoine ; Laffont, Jean-Jacques ; Martimort, David |
Published in: |
Contributions to Theoretical Economics. - Berkeley Electronic Press. - Vol. 2.2003, 1, p. 1055-1055
|
Publisher: |
Berkeley Electronic Press |
Subject: | Supervision | collusion | risk aversion |
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