Risk-Aversion and Prudence in Rent-Seeking Games

This paper considers a common n-agent symmetric rent-seeking game. It derives conditions so that risk-aversion and risk always decrease rent-seeking efforts. These conditions hold for any regular contest success function when risk-averse rent-seekers are also prudent. Under n = 2, prudence is a necessary and sufficient condition for risk-aversion to decrease rent-seeking efforts compared to risk-neutrality. An intuition for this result is given based on a self-protection model.

MoreLess

Year of publication:	2009-02-17
Authors:	Treich, Nicolas
Institutions:	Toulouse School of Economics (TSE)
Subject:	risk-aversion \| rent-seeking \| lobbying \| uncertainty

freely available

Full text |

More access options

Check Google Scholar

In German libraries (KVK)

I need help

More details

Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	TSE Working Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	The text is part of a series TSE Working Paper Number 09-013
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games ; D72 - Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legistures, and Voting Behavior ; D81 - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008465358