Risk aversion in auctions with asymmetrically informed bidders: A "desensitizer" from uncertainty

In the context of first-price auctions with asymmetrically informed bidders, we show that risk aversion not only increases a player's bid, but also makes him less sensitive to the probability that other bidders are informed about his private valuation.

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Year of publication:	2011
Authors:	Muñoz-García, Félix ; Orozco-Alemán, Sandra
Published in:	Economics Letters. - Elsevier, ISSN 0165-1765. - Vol. 112.2011, 1, p. 38-41
Publisher:	Elsevier
Keywords:	First-price auctions Asymmetrically informed bidders Risk aversion Unknown valuations

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Type of publication:	Article
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009146114