Risk aversion, moral hazard, and the principal's loss
Year of publication: |
2002-03-21
|
---|---|
Authors: | Chade, Hector ; Serio, Virginia N. Vera de |
Published in: |
Economic Theory. - Springer. - Vol. 20.2002, 3, p. 637-644
|
Publisher: |
Springer |
Subject: | Moral hazard | Principal-agent | Risk aversion |
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