Risk Sharing vs. Incentives : Contract Design Under Two-Sided Heterogeneity

We study the matching patterns between heterogeneous principals and agents in a principal-agent model. The resulting equilibrium relationship between risk and incentives could be negative, positive or U-shaped. These results may provide an explanation for the absence of systematic empirical support for the standard risk model

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Year of publication:	2007
Authors:	Serfes, Konstantinos
Publisher:	[S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Theorie \| Theory \| Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie \| Agency theory \| Anreiz \| Incentives \| Risikopräferenz \| Risk attitude
Description of contents:	Abstract [papers.ssrn.com]

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Extent:	1 Online-Ressource
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	In: Economics Letters, 2005 Volltext nicht verfügbar
Classification:	C78 - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory ; D81 - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014063861