Risk-shifting and the regulation of bank CEOs’ compensation
Year of publication: |
2013
|
---|---|
Authors: | Chaigneau, Pierre |
Published in: |
Journal of Financial Stability. - Elsevier, ISSN 1572-3089. - Vol. 9.2013, 4, p. 778-789
|
Publisher: |
Elsevier |
Subject: | Banking regulation | CEO incentives | Corporate governance | Moral hazard |
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