Risk taking in asymmetric tournaments

by Matthias Kräkel, Dirk Sliwka

In an asymmetric tournament model with endogenous risk choice by the agents it is shown that equilibrium efforts decrease (increase) with risk if abilities are sufficiently similar (different). Risk also affects winning probabilities. The interaction of both effects is analyzed.

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Year of publication:	November 2001
Authors:	Kräkel, Matthias ; Sliwka, Dirk
Publisher:	Bonn : Bonn Graduate School of Economics, Department of Economics, University of Bonn
Subject:	effort effect \| likelihood effect \| risk taking \| tournament \| Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie \| Agency theory \| Wettbewerb \| Competition \| Risikopräferenz \| Risk attitude \| Leistungsmotivation \| Work motivation \| Theorie \| Theory

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Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (circa 12 Seiten)
Series:	Bonn Econ Discussion Papers / BGSE. - Bonn : Univ., ZDB-ID 2124986-6. - Vol. 2001, 33
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Graue Literatur ; Non-commercial literature ; Arbeitspapier ; Working Paper
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	hdl:10419/78434 [Handle]
Classification:	D23 - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights ; J3 - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs ; M12 - Personnel Management ; Volkswirtschaft: Allgemeines
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011540069