Risky allocations from a risk-neutral informed principal
Year of publication: |
2005
|
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Authors: | Cella, Michela |
Published in: |
Review of economic design : RED. - Berlin : Springer, ISSN 1434-4742, ZDB-ID 1409550-6. - Vol. 9.2005, 3, p. 191-202
|
Subject: | Risikoaversion | Risk aversion | Adverse Selektion | Adverse selection | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Entscheidung unter Risiko | Decision under risk |
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