Robust delegation with uncertain monetary policy preferences
Year of publication: |
2013
|
---|---|
Authors: | Sorge, Marco M. |
Published in: |
Economic modelling. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0264-9993, ZDB-ID 86824-3. - Vol. 30.2013, p. 73-78
|
Subject: | Delegation | Conservative central bank | Preference uncertainty | Minmax policy | Geldpolitik | Monetary policy | Risiko | Risk | Entscheidung unter Unsicherheit | Decision under uncertainty | Präferenztheorie | Theory of preferences | Glaubwürdigkeit | Credibility | Zentralbankunabhängigkeit | Central bank independence | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory |
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