Robust implementation in general mechanisms
A social choice function is robustly implemented if every equilibrium on every type space achieves outcomes consistent with it. We identify a robust monotonicity condition that is necessary and (with mild extra assumptions) sufficient for robust implementation. Robust monotonicity is strictly stronger than both Maskin monotonicity (necessary and almost sufficient for complete information implementation) and ex post monotonicity (necessary and almost sufficient for ex post implementation). It is equivalent to Bayesian monotonicity on all type spaces.
Year of publication: |
2011
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Authors: | Bergemann, Dirk ; Morris, Stephen |
Published in: |
Games and Economic Behavior. - Elsevier, ISSN 0899-8256. - Vol. 71.2011, 2, p. 261-281
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Publisher: |
Elsevier |
Keywords: | Mechanism design Implementation Robustness Common knowledge Interim equilibrium Dominant strategies |
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