Robust incentives for teams
Year of publication: |
2022
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Authors: | Dai, Tianjiao ; Toikka, Juuso |
Published in: |
Econometrica : journal of the Econometric Society, an international society for the advancement of economic theory in its relation to statistics and mathematics. - Chichester : Wiley-Blackwell, ISSN 1468-0262, ZDB-ID 1477253-X. - Vol. 90.2022, 4, p. 1583-1613
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Subject: | incentives | interest alignment | linear contracts | maxmin | Moral hazard | optimal contracts | robustness | teams | Vertrag | Contract | Arbeitsgruppe | Team | Moral Hazard | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Vertragstheorie | Contract theory |
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