Robust incentives for teams
Year of publication: |
2022
|
---|---|
Authors: | Dai, Tianjiao ; Toikka, Juuso |
Subject: | incentives | interest alignment | linear contracts | maxmin | Moral hazard | optimal contracts | robustness | teams | Moral Hazard | Arbeitsgruppe | Team | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Vertragstheorie | Contract theory | Vertrag | Contract | Anreiz | Incentives | Leistungsentgelt | Performance pay |
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