Robust mechanisms for risk-averse sellers
Year of publication: |
2020
|
---|---|
Authors: | Sundararajan, Mukund ; Yan, Qiqi |
Published in: |
Games and economic behavior. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0899-8256, ZDB-ID 1002944-8. - Vol. 124.2020, p. 644-658
|
Subject: | Optimal auctions | Revenue maximization | Risk-aversion | Utility | Risikoaversion | Risk aversion | Auktionstheorie | Auction theory | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information |
-
Insider trading in sequential auction markets with risk-aversion and time-discounting
Vitale, Paolo, (2017)
-
Auction design with shortlisting when value discovery is covert
Agastya, Murali, (2023)
-
Optimal auctions : non-expected utility and constant risk aversion
Gershkov, Alex, (2022)
- More ...
-
On the price of truthfulness in path auctions
Yan, Qiqi, (2007)
-
Envy freedom and prior-free mechanism design
Devanur, Nikhil, (2015)
-
Revenue maximization with a single sample
Dhangwatnotai, Peerapong, (2015)
- More ...