Robust Mechanisms Under Common Valuation

I construct an informationally robust auction to sell a common-value good. I examine the revenue guarantee of an auction over all information structures of bidders and all equilibria. As the number of bidders gets large, the revenue guarantee of my auction converges to the full surplus, regardless of how information changes as more bidders are added. My auction also maximizes the revenue guarantee when there is a single bidder

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Year of publication:	2018
Authors:	Du, Songzi
Publisher:	[2018]: [S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Theorie \| Theory \| Robustes Verfahren \| Robust statistics

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Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (27 p)
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	In: Econometrica, Forthcoming Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments April 26, 2018 erstellt
Other identifiers:	10.2139/ssrn.2751604 [DOI]
Classification:	D44 - Auctions ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012936352