Robustly optimal auctions with unknown resale opportunities
Year of publication: |
2019
|
---|---|
Authors: | Carroll, Gabriel ; Segal, Ilya |
Published in: |
The review of economic studies : RES. - Oxford : Oxford Univ. Pr., ISSN 1467-937X, ZDB-ID 2009656-2. - Vol. 86.2019, 4, p. 1527-1555
|
Subject: | Ausubel-Cramton-Vickrey (ACV) auction | Auctions with resale | Duality in auction design | Non-local incentive constraints | Robust revenue maximization | Worst case | Auktionstheorie | Auction theory | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Mechanismus-Design-Theorie | Mechanism design |
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