Robustness of equilibria in anonymous local games
This paper studies the robustness of symmetric equilibria in anonymous local games to perturbations of prior beliefs. Two priors are strategically close on a class of games if players receive similar expected payoffs in equilibrium under the priors, for any game in that class. I show that if the structure of payoff interdependencies is sparse in a well-defined sense, the conditions for strategic proximity in anonymous local games are strictly weaker than the conditions for general Bayesian games of Kajii and Morris (1998) [11] when attention is restricted to symmetric equilibria. Hence, by exploiting the properties of anonymous local games, it is possible to obtain stronger robustness results for this class.
Year of publication: |
2011
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Authors: | Kets, Willemien |
Published in: |
Journal of Economic Theory. - Elsevier, ISSN 0022-0531. - Vol. 146.2011, 1, p. 300-325
|
Publisher: |
Elsevier |
Keywords: | Incomplete information Higher-order beliefs Robustness Strategic proximity Local interactions Anonymous games Heterogeneous externalities Network games |
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