Rock–paper–scissors and cycle-based games

The present work characterizes the unique Nash equilibrium for games that are based on a cyclic preference relation. In the Nash equilibrium of these games, each player randomizes between three specific actions. In particular, an alternative way of deriving the unique Nash equilibrium of the rock–paper–scissors game is proposed.

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Year of publication:	2012
Authors:	Bahel, Eric
Published in:	Economics Letters. - Elsevier, ISSN 0165-1765. - Vol. 115.2012, 3, p. 401-403
Publisher:	Elsevier
Subject:	Cycle \| Nash equilibrium \| Prudent strategy

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Type of publication:	Article
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010576437