Room Assignment-Rent Division: A Market Approach

A group of friends consider renting a house but they shall first agree on how to allocate its rooms and share the rent. We propose an auction mechanism for room assignment-rent division problems which mimics the market mechanism. Our auction mechanism is efficient, envy-free, individually-rational and it yields a non-negative price to each room whenever that is possible with envy-freeness.

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Year of publication:	2002-02-13
Authors:	Abdulkadiroglu, Atila ; Sonmez, Tayfun ; Unver, M. Utku
Institutions:	EconWPA

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Game Theory and Information.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	Type of Document - Adobe pdf; prepared on IBM PC - PC- TEX/Scientific WorkPlace;
Classification:	C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory ; D8 - Information and Uncertainty
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005407604