Rooted-tree solutions for tree games
In this paper, we study cooperative games with limited cooperation possibilities, represented by a tree on the set of agents. Agents in the game can cooperate if they are connected in the tree. We introduce natural extensions of the average (rooted)-tree solution (see [Herings, P., van der Laan, G., Talman, D., 2008. The average tree solution for cycle free games. Games and Economic Behavior 62, 77-92]): the marginalist tree solutions and the random tree solutions. We provide an axiomatic characterization of each of these sets of solutions. By the way, we obtain a new characterization of the average tree solution.
Year of publication: |
2010
|
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Authors: | Béal, Sylvain ; Rémila, Eric ; Solal, Philippe |
Published in: |
European Journal of Operational Research. - Elsevier, ISSN 0377-2217. - Vol. 203.2010, 2, p. 404-408
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Publisher: |
Elsevier |
Keywords: | C71 Average tree solution Communication structure Marginal contributions Random (order) values |
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