Rules (of bidding) to generate equal stated profits: An axiomatic approach

Although one may hope to achieve equality of stated profits without enforcing it, one may not trust in such voluntary equality seeking and rather try to impose rules (of bidding) guaranteeing it. Our axiomatic approach is based on envy-free net trades according to bids which, together with the equality requirement, characterize the first-prize auction and fair division game.

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Year of publication:	2010
Authors:	Güth, Werner
Publisher:	Jena : Friedrich Schiller University Jena and Max Planck Institute of Economics
Subject:	Auktionstheorie \| Verteilungsgerechtigkeit \| Neid \| Gerechtigkeit \| Theorie \| Auctions \| Fair Division \| Procedural fairness \| Envy-Freeness

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Series:	Jena Economic Research Papers ; 2010,014
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Working Paper
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	62227399X [GVK] hdl:10419/32604 [Handle]
Classification:	D44 - Auctions ; D63 - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement ; C72 - Noncooperative Games ; D74 - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances
Source:	EconStor

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010267112