Rules of Origin as Commercial Policy Instruments
This article examines the role of rules of origin as a commercial policy instrument that targets the input composition of imports. Using a three-country, partial equilibrium structure, we demonstrate conditions under which the imposition of a binding rule will be welfare improving for an importer facing competitive export suppliers. We further show that employing rules of origin in this way would be complementary to, rather than a substitute for, conventional optimal tariffs. Copyright Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association
Year of publication: |
2002
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Authors: | Falvey, Rod ; Reed, Geoff |
Published in: |
International Economic Review. - Department of Economics. - Vol. 43.2002, 2, p. 393-408
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Publisher: |
Department of Economics |
Saved in:
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