Rush, delay or money burning : informational biases in policy decisions
Year of publication: |
2000
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Authors: | Gersbach, Hans |
Published in: |
Economics of governance. - Berlin : Springer, ISSN 1435-6104, ZDB-ID 1491330-6. - Vol. 1.2000, 2, p. 137-155
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Subject: | Neue politische Ökonomie | Public choice | Signalling | Glaubwürdigkeit | Credibility | Öffentliche Investition | Public investment | Zeitverwendung | Time use | Optionspreistheorie | Option pricing theory | Theorie | Theory | Nichtkooperatives Spiel | Noncooperative game | Politische Entscheidung | Political decision |
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