Sabotage in Asymmetric Contests – An Experimental Analysis

In a contest players compete for winning a prize by effort and thereby increasing their probability of winning. Contestants, however, could also improve their own relative position by harming the other players. We experimentally analyze contests with heterogeneous agents who may individually sabotage each other. Our results suggest that sabotaging behavior systematically varies with the composition of different types of agents in a contest. Moreover, if the saboteur's identity is revealed sabotage decreases while retaliation motives prevail.

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Year of publication:	2004
Authors:	Kräkel, Matthias ; Irlenbusch, Bernd ; Harbring, Christine ; Selten, Reinhard
Publisher:	Bonn : University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE)
Subject:	Wettbewerb \| Experiment \| Nichtkooperatives Spiel \| Theorie \| Tournament \| Contest \| Experiments \| Sabotage

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Series:	Bonn Econ Discussion Papers ; 12/2004
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Working Paper
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	392675595 [GVK] hdl:10419/22890 [Handle] RePEc:zbw:bonedp:122004 [RePEc]
Classification:	C91 - Laboratory, Individual Behavior ; C72 - Noncooperative Games ; J33 - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods ; J41 - Contracts: Specific Human Capital, Matching Models, Efficiency Wage Models, and Internal Labor Markets
Source:	EconStor

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010263109