Sales Maximization and Specific Human Capital

Profit-maximizing owners of firms may find it optimal to provide managers with incentives to maximize sales in addition to profits. This influences the outcome of the bargaining game between workers and managers over workers' wages and helps to solve the problem of underinvestment by workers in specific human capital. I investigate optimal managerial contracts from this point of view and show that the optimal contract is a function of sales in addition to profits

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Year of publication:	[2000]
Authors:	Zabojnik, Jan
Publisher:	[2000]: [S.l.] : SSRN
Description of contents:	Abstract [papers.ssrn.com]

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Extent:	1 Online-Ressource
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	In: Rand Journal of Economics, Vol. 29, No. 4, Winter 1998 Volltext nicht verfügbar
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012788999