Salience games : private politics when public attention is limited
Year of publication: |
2018
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Authors: | Heyes, Anthony ; Lyon, Thomas P. ; Martin, Steve |
Published in: |
Journal of environmental economics and management : JEEM ; the official journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0095-0696, ZDB-ID 188687-3. - Vol. 88.2018, p. 396-410
|
Subject: | Limited attention | NGOs | Non-market strategy | Salience | Nichtregierungsorganisation | Non-governmental organization | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Wahrnehmung | Perception | Konsumentenverhalten | Consumer behaviour |
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