Satisficing in strategic environments: A theoretical approach and experimental evidence
The satisficing approach is generalized and applied to finite n-person games. We formally define the concept of satisficing and propose a theory that allows satisficing players to make "optimal" decisions without being equipped with any prior. We also review some experiments on strategic games illustrating and partly supporting our theoretical approach.
Year of publication: |
2010
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Authors: | Güth, Werner ; Vittoria Levati, M. ; Ploner, Matteo |
Published in: |
Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics). - Elsevier, ISSN 2214-8043. - Vol. 39.2010, 5, p. 554-561
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Publisher: |
Elsevier |
Keywords: | Strategic interaction Satisficing behavior Bounded rationality |
Saved in:
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