Say Pays! Shareholder Voice and Firm Performance
This paper estimates the effects of Say-on-Pay (SoP); a policy that increases shareholder "voice" by providing shareholders with a regular vote on executive pay. We apply a regression discontinuity design to the votes on shareholder-sponsored SoP proposals. Adopting SoP leads to large increases in market value (4.6%) and to improvements in long-term performance: profitability and labor productivity increase, while overheads and investment fall. In contrast, we find limited effects on pay levels and structure. This suggests that SoP operates as a regular vote of confidence, increasing efficiency and market value.
Year of publication: |
2013
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Authors: | Cuñat, Vicente ; Giné, Mireia ; Guadalupe, Maria |
Institutions: | Financial Markets Group |
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