Scale economies and rent-seeking in legislative parties
This paper examines equilibrium legislative party size, based upon scale economies in producing political outcomes. Political production — finding policies legislators desire and vote-trading to pass them — has strong scale economies up to, but not far beyond, a majority of the voters. Either one or two parties is efficient, but a larger number is not. A single party's optimal long-run strategy is to benefit a dominant majority by avoiding the creation of an effective second party. But short-term rent-seeking is in legislators' and leaders' interests, which eventually causes a second effective party and a stable two-party equilibrium. Estimates of party size for the U.S. Congress suggest considerable short-term rent-seeking. Copyright Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1987
Year of publication: |
1987
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Authors: | Koford, Kenneth |
Published in: |
Public Choice. - Springer. - Vol. 52.1987, 1, p. 35-55
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Publisher: |
Springer |
Saved in:
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